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Abstract
We consider propositional quantification in intuitionistic logic. We prove that, 
under topological interpretation over Cantor space, it enjoys surprising and in­
teresting properties such as maximum property and a kind of distribution of 
existential quantifier over conjunction. Moreover, by pointing to the appropri­
ate examples, we show that the set of quantified formulas valid in Cantor space 
strictly contains the set of formulas provable in the minimal system of intuition- 
istic logic with propositional quantification.
The well-known topological interpretation of intuitionistic proposi­
tional connectives, introduced by A. Tarski in [6], can be naturally ex­
tended to propositional quantifiers. This gives us a large variety of mod­
els for propositional quantification, since, of course, different topological 
properties of the spaces in question give rise to different sets of validated 
formulas.
From among these models, some seem to draw our special attention. 
Cantor space is one of the examples and there are several reasons for this 
choice. First, as it is well-known, Cantor space is a universal space for Heyt- 
ing calculus, IPC, which means that a formula F is IPC-provable if and only 
if it is valid in Cantor space. Thus, in the context of intuitionistic logic, the 
topological semantics over Cantor space seems to be very natural. Second, 
let us consider the minimal system of intuitionistic logic with propositional 
quantification, IPC2 , which results in adding to the usual axiomatization 
of Heyting calculus the basic axioms and rules for propositional quantifi­
cation, like the axioms VpF(p) F(q) and F(q) 3pF(p), and the rules
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F (p) G/3pF(p) G and G F (p)/G 'VpF(p), where p is not free 
in G. Any acceptable interpretation of propositional quantification must 
validate these axioms and rules of inference, but the point is that the min­
imal system is intuitively incomplete: there are formulas which, although 
intuitively acceptable on the intuitionistic ground, are not derivable in it. 
The formula —Vp(p V —p) is probably the most natural example. It can be 
shown that this formula is not generally valid in topological models. On 
the other hand, as we will see, in Cantor space, the formula in question is 
valid. Moreover, we will show that many other formulas of this kind are 
valid in Cantor space. Finally, using the well-known result of M. O. Rabin, 
cf. [5], we can prove that the set of all formulas valid in Cantor space is 
decidable. This contrasts with the case of the set of formulas valid in the 
class of all topological spaces, cf. [1].
In the sequel, we extend the notion of a formula (in the language 
of propositional variables p,q,... and propositional connectives —, V, A, ^) 
by allowing quantification over propositional variables. We start with a 
general property of topological interpretation of propositional quantifiers. 
Given a topological space T, and an assignment P, Q of open subset of T 
to the propositional variables p,q, each formula F(q) is interpreted as an 
open subset F[Q] of the space. Our definition of F[Q] is standard in case 
that F is formed by using propositional connectives only; the quantifiers 
are interpreted as follows:
(BpF)[Q] = J{F[P,Q] : P -open}
(VpF )[Q ] = int Q{F [P,Q ] : P -open}.
The basic fact that will be frequently used can be stated as follows:
Theorem 1. For any topological space T, any formula F(p,q), and any 
open sets P, Q, S of T:
F[P,Q] n S = F[Pn S,Q].
From Theorem 1 it follows that for every x G T and every neighbor­
hood S of x we have
x G F[P1, . . . , Pn] iff x G F[P1 n S, . . . , Pn n S].
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So, accordingly, the topological interpretation of formulas has local char­
acter. To illustrate this fact let us consider some operators defined by 
monadic formulas of the language of IPC. Consider a formula F (p) such 
that IPC F (p V —p) F. Notice that F[P] is always a dense subset of T,
thus x G F[P] iff x is an element of some nowhere dense subset of the space. 
In particular, if F = p V —p then x G F [P] iff x belongs to the boundary of 
P, and if F = ——p p then x G F [P] iff in any neighborhood of x there
are points of intclP not belonging to P etc.
Now let us turn to specific properties of the interpretation of propo­
sitional quantification in Cantor space. By Cantor space we mean the set 
2“ with the usual product topology. As a basis of 2“ we can take the sets 
Vn of all sequences a with a fixed initial segment whose code is n. Notice 
that the sets Vn are both closed and open. The family of all open subsets 
of 2“ will be denoted by Q(2“).
First, we show that, for any formula F(p, 7) and any open sets Q, the 
intersection of all F [P, Q], with P ranging over all open subsets of 2“, is 
always an open set. In particular, we can simplify the interpretation of the 
universal quantifier in the following way.
Theorem 2. For every formula F(p, 7) and any Q G Q(2“) we have
(VpF )[Q ]= Q f [P,Q ].
p eQ(2“)
Proof. Assume that a G int p| P :q(2_ ) F [P, Q ]. Hence, by the properties 
of Cantor space, we can find a sequence (an)n£“ with an G 2“ \ {a} and 
sets Pn G Q(2“) such that an G F[Pn, Q] for n G w, and such that a is the 
unique accumulation point of (an)n£“, i.e. a is the unique point of 2“ such 
that in every neighborhood of a there are some elements of the sequence 
(an)ng“. Let, for every n G w, Un be a basic set such that an G Un; 
since a is the only point of accumulation of the sequence (an)n£“, we 
can additionally assume that the sets Un are pairwise disjoint. Now put 
P Un^“(Un F Pn). We shall show that a G F[P, Q]. Observe that, since 
the sets Un are closed and open and pairwise disjoint, by Theorem 1 we 
have Un F —F[Pn, Q] = Un F F[P, Q]. Hence, for every n G w, we get an G 
Un F —F[Pn,Q] C —F[P, Q] which implies a G cl — F[P, Q] = — F[P, Q], 
since a is the accumulation point of (an)n£“. □
68 Tomasz Połacik
Our next goal is to prove that for any propositional formula F which 
is not intuitionistically valid, the negation of the universal closure of F is 
true in 2“.
We begin with a technical fact. Let $k : 2“ Vk be the mapping 
defined by $k(a) = k*a where k*a is the concatenation of a finite sequence 
of the code k and an (infinite) one denoted by a. Notice that each $k is 
an homeomorphism from 2“ onto Vk. By induction on the complexity of 
the formula F, the following can be proved:
Lemma 3. Let F(pi,. .. ,pn) and Pi,... ,Pn G Q(2“) be arbitrary. Then, 
for every k,
$k (F[Pi, . ..,Pn]) = F[$k(Pi), ..., Wn)] n Vk.
Using Lemma 3 we prove the announced property of the interpretation 
over Cantor space.
Theorem 4. Let F(pi, . . . , pn) be a quantifier-free formula which is not 
provable in IPC. Then
2“ |= ­ Vpi . . . VpnF(pi, . . . , pn).
Proof. It is well-known that every IPC-non-provable formula can be 
falsified in 2“. Thus we have
FP,...,P*] = 2“ for some P?,...,P* G Q(2“). (1)
Suppose, for a proof by contradiction, that Qp p ;q(2_) F = 0. Then 
we find a basic set Vk such that Vk C F[Pi,..., Pn] for every open sets 
P1, . . . , Pn. On the other hand, by (1) and Lemma 3, we get
Vk \ F RPD,..., $(P„*)] = 0,
a contradiction. □
Notice that, in general, in 2“ it is impossible to reduce an (infinite) 
intersection p|p:q(2_) F[P] to a finite one. To see this consider VpF(p) for 
a formula F(p) of the language of IPC which is a classical tautology but is 
not provable in IPC. Then in 2“ we have Qp;q(2_) F[P] = 0, i.e.,
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U -F[P] = 2 , (2)
p eQ(2“)
(cf. [3]). Notice that the sets F[P] are all open and dense and hence their 
complements are nowhere-dense. Now, if the union (2) were reducible to 
some finite union, then 2“ would be a finite union of its nowhere-dense 
subsets, quod non.
This property shows an asymmetry in topological interpretation of the 
propositional quantifiers because, as we shall show, the interpretation over 
Cantor space bears a kind of maximum property.
Theorem 5. For every formula F(p,q) and every Q G Q(2“) there is an 
open set PF such that
(3pF )[Q ]= F [Pf ,Q ].
Proof. Let F(p, q) be a formula and let Q G Q(2“). We claim that, for 
any basic set V of 2“,
if V C (Jp;q(2_) F[P,Q], then there exists PV G Q(2“) such 
that V C F[PV, Q].
For the proof of the claim, notice that for every a G V we can find Pa G 
Q(2“) and a basic set Va with a G Va C F[Pa,Q]. Consider the family 
V = {Va : a G V}. Obviously, V is a covering of V. By compactness 
of V, we find Vai,..., Vak G V such that V C Vai U ... U Vak; we can 
additionally assume that the sets Vai,..., Vak are pairwise disjoint. Put
Pv = U (Pa n Va).
1<j<k
Notice that PV n Vaj = Paj for 1 < j < k. Moreover, by Theorem 1,
Va n F[PV,Q] = Va n F[Pa ,Q]. (3)
Now, let a G V. Then for some i we have a G Vai C F[Pai, Q]. Hence, 
by (3), we get a G F[PV, Q]. Thus V C F[PV, Q], which proves the claim.
Now we can show that (3pF)[Q] C F[PF, Q]. Assume that
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(3pF)[Q] = U V
iei
for some family {Vi : i G I} of pairwise disjoint basic sets. By the Claim, 
for every i G I we can find Pi G Q(2“) such that Vi C F[Pi, Q]. Put
Pf = J Pi F Vi.
iei
It is easy to see that Vi C F [Pf , Q] for every i G I. Hence
J F[P,Q] = J Vi C F[Pf,Q].
p eQ(2^) iei □
It is worth noting that the set PF of Theorem 5 is not, in general, 
definable by a propositional formula. Indeed, recall that, according to [2], 
there exists an interpretation of propositional quantification within intu- 
itionistic propositional logic IPC. In this interpretation, 3pF is interpreted 
as the weakest upper interpolant of F not containing the variable p, de­
noted by EpF. Notice that the formula 3pF EpF is valid in any model 
of IPC2. Now, if PF were defined over Cantor space by means of a proposi­
tional formula then, for F quantifier-free, the formula 3pF(p, q) would be 
equivalent to Ep (F). On the other hand, it is known that for formulas 
involving at least two variables, the two interpretations of propositional 
quantification in question differ from each other (cf. [4]).
Theorem 5 motivates the introduction of the following definition.
Definition. For every formula F(p, q) and every Q G Q(2“), we put
Eq(F) = {R : (3pF)[Q] = F[R,Q]}.
Notice that, by Theorem 5, for every formula F(p, q) and every Q G 
Q(2“) the family Eq(F) is non-empty, moreover it is easy to see that Eq(F) 
can be infinite. However, given a formula F(p, q) and Q G Q(2“), the proof 
of Theorem 5 does not provide us with a method of constructing any of the 
sets of Eq(F), and in general, it is not easy to find its elements. However, 
in some cases, given a member of Eq (F), we can find its elements by other 
means. This is the essence of the next theorem.
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Theorem 6. For every formula F(p, q), every open sets P, Q of Cantor 
space, and every basic set V C F[P, Q], there is a set R G Eq(F) such thatV n P = V n R. Q
Proof. Assume that V is a basic set and V C F[P, Q]. Moreover, let
J F [P,Q] = J Vni
p eQ(2^) iei
for some I and pairwise disjoint basic sets Vni. Then, of course, V C Vnj 
for some j G I. First, assume that V = Vnj. Recall that the set Eq(F) is 
non-empty, so we can choose S G Eq (F). Put
R = (Sn (J Vni) u (P n V).
i=j
It is easy to see that Vni n R = Vni n S for i = j and V n R = V n S. We 
shall show that R G Eq(F). Let i = j; we have Vni = Vni nF[S, Q]. Hence, 
by Theorem 1, we get Vni = Vni n F[R, Q], i.e., Vni C F[R, Q] for i = j. 
Consequently,
V = Vnj = Vnj n f [S, Q] = Vnj n f [R, Q],
whence
J F[P,Q] = J C F[R,Q],
P-Q(2- ) iel
i.e.,  R G Eq(F). In the case when V C Vnj for some j G I, we represent 
Vnj as the union V u Vm1 u . . . u Vmk of pairwise disjoint basic sets and so 
reduce this case to the previous one. □
We apply Theorem 6 to prove another property of propositional quan­
tification.
Theorem 7. For any formulas F(p, q) and G(p, q) and any Q G Q(2“), 
we have
(3p(F A G))[Q]= J F[P,Q] U J G[P,Q].
PeEQ (G) P£Eq (F)
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Proof. Let V be a basic set with V C 3p(F A G)[Q ]. Then, by Theorem 5, 
for some R G Q(2“), we have
V C F[R, Q] n F[R, Q].
Hence, according to Theorem 6, there are RF G Eq(F) and RG G Eq(G) 
such that V n RF = V n RG = V n R. Thus,
v C f[Rg,Q] n g[Rf,Q].
For the converse, assume that RF G Eq(F) and RG G Eq(G). Observe that
F[Rg,Q] n G[Rf,Q] C (F A G)[Rf,Q] U (F A G)[Rg,Q]
C (3p(F A G))[Q],
since, of course, F[RG, Q] n G[RF, Q] C F[RF, Q] n G[Rg, Q]. □
Note that the unions |JP.E ,(G) F[P, Q] and |JP.E ,(f) G[P, Q] which 
occur in Theorem 7 can be viewed as bounded quantifiers. So, in a sense 
Theorem 7 expresses a kind of distributivity of existential quantification 
over conjunction.
Using Theorem 5 we prove some further properties of existential quan­
tification under the interpretation over Cantor space. For example, the 
following fact is easy to verify.
Theorem 8. The following formulas are valid in 2“:
1. ——3pF 3p——F,
2. (G 3pF) 3p(G F), where p is not free in G.
Let us conclude with some remarks.
Theorem 8 shows that, as far as we consider the topological inter­
pretation of propositional quantification in Cantor space, we can shift the 
existential quantifier in front of the implication. Note that Cantor space 
does not validate the following, intuitively not acceptable on intuitionistic 
ground, shift of the universal quantifier from the antecedent on an impli­
cation: (VpF G) 3p(F G), with p not free in G. Indeed, consider 
any formula quantifier-free formula F(p) with one variable p such that F 
is a tautology of classical propositional logic but it is not provable in IPC.
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Then, by Theorem 4, in Cantor space the formula VpF G is valid. On 
the other hand, it is shown in [3] that (in particular) in Cantor space the 
formula 3p(F G) is equivalent to ——G.
As we mentioned, the set of all formulas valid in Cantor space is de­
cidable and, as we have shown, strictly contains the minimal system of in- 
tuitionistic logic with propositional quantification. We think that it would 
be interesting to find a natural axiomatization of quantified propositional 
intuitionistic logic of Cantor space.
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